Palm Beach yacht fire - La Diva is destroyed

Hi,

Do you have the holy grail as to what happened to the ESTONIA?

A lot of those battering their keyboards to death over here would like to know one way or the other.

http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread78342/pg1

There is no "holy graal" in the Estonia case, only poor seamanship!
Imagine the scenario:
A captain, with a salary he could only dream about 5 years earlier, before the iron curtain fell. Frequently told by his mgm the importance of keeping the schedule and also told/knowing there are hundereds of people just drooling over the opportunity of replacing him...

A tangible example:
My brother in law, former 1st mate on a Silja Line Baltic ferry, told me that in the big storm prior to the one sinking Estonia, they were 4,5 hours late to their destination. Viking Line 5hrs and Estonia 45minutes!

You can not push a ship head first, full speed right into a Beaufort 10 or more.

PS
Regarding the more or less fatuous conspiration theories why she sank so quickly, I doubt those debaters have ever sat foot onboard a ferry or RoRo ship.
A child would understand what will happen if any of the stern or bow doors are ripped off.

Sven, ‘Imagining’ the scenario, is exactly what the ‘theorists’ have been doing since the day the Estonia sank. K1W1 is, quite rightly, asking if you have any hard facts - such as the Marine Investigator’s report?

According to what I read here: http://www.safety-at-sea.co.uk/mvestonia/ "the cause was a lack of compliance with minimum SOLAS requirements on forward collision bulkhead".

Hi,

The whole paragraph where NYCAP extracted the line above reads like this.

However, in view of the conclusion on the most likely sinking sequence of MV Estonia, it can confidently be stated that the lack of compliance with minimum SOLAS requirements on forward collision bulkhead by MV Estonia on the night of 27/28th of September 1994, was the main reason for unobstructed ingress of sea water into the car deck spaces and, therefore, that this was the main cause of the ship loss in the light of international maritime law.

The statement that the Master who was worried about his job and drove the ship to the bottom in an effort to keep to the operating timetable is not described here as the root cause. The fact that the ship did not comply with the minimum SOLAS requirements on forward collision bulkheads is one area that should come under very careful scrutiny.

SOLAS and IMO et al have a wonderful set of rules and regulations to make everyone and everything safer and provide more accountability.

These type of things are all very well when written on paper, the job of judging if what is shown on the construction drawings and that which is actually built comply with the written word is often left to a Class Surveyor who is doing the job on behalf of SOLAS,Flag or someone else. Each surveyor is entitled to their own interpretation of the rules and regs.

For those who have never been at the coalface in some of these discussions you would probably be surprised as to how many ways the same words can be "interpreted" by different very well educated and experienced people.

And therin lie the joys and frustrations of this business.

The availability of "wriggle room" to negotiate an interpretation allows us to enhance, or at least maintain, safety while reducing costs just as it also allows the less than ethical to manipulate the process for their own purposes.

Technology has far outpaced the regulators and this continues to cost everyone except flag and class a great deal of money.

Thanks Ed,

That is a very ueseful link.

Well said!

Very true - and it's not just the marine industry either!

Keep in mind that the report being tossed around here is not the official findings of the flag state. The link below leads to the official version.

http://www.kolumbus.fi/estonia/estorap.html#_Toc405839593

Another issue is that the governments involved have made it impossible to investigate the wreck and conclusively determine the extent of damage and its most probably cause.

One has to ask why a shipwreck is sacred and untouchable when, for example, an airliner lying in a field or submerged at equal or greater depths is so thoroughly recovered and investigated.



Read this bit then read Chapter 18.2.

3.6.3 Collision bulkhead compliance

The SOLAS Convention requires passenger ships to have a collision bulkhead, and an upper extension of the collision bulkhead in ships with long forward superstructure, located at a distance from the forward perpendicular of minimum 5 per cent of the length of the ship between perpendiculars and maximum 5 per cent of the length of the ship plus 3 m. This requirement was formulated at an early stage and remained basically unchanged during the further development of the SOLAS Convention. However, in the 1981 Amendments to SOLAS 1974, which entered into force on 1 September 1984, the rule was extended to include cargo ships and modified to allow taking into account a bulbous bow. This was done by adding wording permitting the datum line from which the position of the collision bulkhead is determined to be moved forward from the forward perpendicular by half the length of the bulbous bow by 1.5 per cent of the length of the ship or by 3 m, whichever was the shortest. The 1981 Amendments considered also for the first time especially the use of the ramp as an upper extension of the collision bulkhead. It was stated that the part of the ramp which is more than 2.3 m above the bulkhead may extend forward of the limit specified above.

The position of the bow ramp of ESTONIA did not satisfy the SOLAS requirements for an upper extension of the collision bulkhead. No exemption was issued. Such an exemption could be given on condition that the vessel in the course of its voyages did not proceed more than 20 nautical miles from the nearest land.

The building specification stated that a "partial collision door" was "for the intended service not required by the Finnish Board of Navigation". An upper extension of the collision bulkhead, complying with the SOLAS 1974 rules, should have been located minimum 4.27 m and maximum 7.27 m aft of the position of the lower end of the ramp (Figure 3.13). Complying with the 1981 Amendments to SOLAS 1974 the upper extension of the collision bulkhead could have been about 2 m further forward.

The surveys under the SOLAS convention were, during the period under Finnish flag, carried out by the Finnish Board of Navigation. Bureau Veritas had no authorisation to survey the vessel for compliance with the SOL.AS Convention. When Bureau Veritas surveyed the vessel for change of flag this was done in accordance with the requirements to the extent of a periodic survey, which did not include examination of construction drawings. The location of the extension of the collision bulkhead was thus not considered during this survey. The background and likely circumstances related to the location of the ramp are covered in Chapter 18.

Hi,

I think this is what is driving the conspiracy theorists.

If you and I do a big Europe loop together ( at separate times onboard) and one of us disappears along with the boat I would like to know what has happened when the wreck is found

What do you think?

I think you are very cleverly setting up an alibi for your plan to collect the insurance on a direlect river barge you just found and plan to "spray can overhaul" before asking some gullible engineer to "deliver" it for you ...

Other than that, it sounds good to me!

Fire safety on yachts

Sidestepping from the Estonia to the fire safety issue for a moment here...

It's a simple fact that the MCA code for yachts under 500 GT is very undemanding in the field of fire safety. But should we really be wishing for stricter rules, if anyone is free to increase his level of safety as much as he wishes?

The advantage of the current situation is that owners can "go shopping" for solutions which really enhance safety without inflicting on comfort or level of finishing. A few suggestions (none of these are required):
- A30 or A60 insulation around the galley and galley extraction duct
- Non-combustible wall, ceiling & floor panelling
- B-15 doors for cabins
- automatic sprinklers or (preferably) watermist fixed fire extinguishing system in the cabins and public spaces
- manual-release watermist system in the engine room. This a lot quicker and safer (for personel) than using a gas-based fire extinguishing system. Also, the system does no damage whatsoever, so crew will use it more readily without hesitation.
- insulating watertight bulkheads to A-60 standard to create fire zones.

None of these are required for yachts below 500 GT under the MCA LY2-code, simply because there hasn't been any loss of life in yachting. But why wait until that happens?
We all pay extra for airbags in our cars, which are not legally required, yet with superyachts it seems 80-90 % of the people sticks to the bare minimum asked by the regulations.
In car terms, most superyachts are Bentleys or Maseratis with the safety systems of a Dacia or a Lada. It's up to owners to beef up the specs on their boats, during newbuilds or refits.

Bruno

Because that is the traditional way of these things.

It is not a jest that transportation safety regulators are called "tombstone agencies." They just count the tombstones and when the number becomes embarrasing or they make the front page, they make a bunch of noise and sometimes do something that has been crystal clear to those "at the coal face" for years.

The more important or well known the victims the more comprehensive the regulations.

I am coming into this thread way late. This is all very interesting from a fire standpoint. Are these yacht fire systems non-automatic? Why wouldn't you have a temp/smoke detection system in the ER that would kick in if a fire is detected? Why would a owner/captain have to manually activate such system? If all on board are on the hook and asleep, who would know if a fire or smoke situation broke out? Are all electrical wires run through conduit like a commerical building? Arc related fires should be minimal with a proper electrical panel and working breakers.
With the amount of running units....mains, gensets, AC units, converters etc. the ER should have redundant systems to prevent any fire/smoke situation from leaving the ER. Alarms should sound all over the boat with the activation of the automatic system.
If a pleasure yacht is not so equipted, then how does one sleep at night?

All inboard boats above (I think) about 26' are equiped with an automatic engine room fire estinguisher system that can also be triggered manually. However I've been involved with putting out 2 small engine room fires (mostly smoke & melting wires) where the system didn't activate. So, I'm not sure at what point they're set to trigger. The rest of the boat (up to a large certain point) are dependent on manual extinguishers or hoses. Carbon monoxide detectors are standard, but not smoke detectors. I believe that most boat fires, especially when moored, are electrical.

If electrical in nature....then a short would trip the breaker, the culprit must then be an overload which would cause a steady rise in heat build-up which could then ignite surrounding materials. I have read that improper connected shore power cords, loose plugs etc. can cause this senario. This could be prevented by an inline....between the shore power connection and vessel voltage/amperage monitor to trip when the power falls, or rises pre-set limits.
All I do know is that every Naval sailor is trained to be a fireman, since fire is the most common, most deadly situation aboard a ship....or an iceberg....

Eventually.

Theoretically all licensed crew are also. As for th average boat owner, ROFLMAO

I thought that might be the case.

Regretfully, my reply/comment dragged Estonia into the discussion which wasn't my intentinon. I'll not comment that unfortunate ship anymore, but just mention none of the forwarded theroiries are wrong.
A disaster like this do not occur without a cain of adherent reasons.

No doubt design, construction, survey, maintenance, etc, could have been done better, but without the ripped off bow visor, the ship would probably still sailing today! A vital part of the ship which was destroyed by too high speed in bad weather, period.

As far as I'm concerned, rest in peace Estonia!