Palm Beach yacht fire - La Diva is destroyed

Wow! Some kind of response!
Much appreciated than what's normal, others tend to stick the head down the sand...

Marmot, AMG, and Pascal all basically asking what my concerns are and if there is an agenda of some kind.

The answer is of course YES!
Qouting the first sentence in my post, I refer to the passenger ship community 20-25 years ago when that industry refused to realize most ships sailed with deficiant or inferior safety management onboard. An environment I have been a part of during all those years.

The tecnical equipment, maintanence routines and crisis management were at such low standard that today's youngsters, newcomers wouldn't believe anyone could take responsability for such poor construction.

So how come the situation changed? The answer is just as simple as tragic: Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star and Estonia!
Those 3 major disasters with hundered of casualties together forced the industry, lead by SOLAS, to enhance the safety regulations to the level where we are at date; public transport over water is consequently the by far safest means of travel! Not one major fatal accident on a SOLAS-ship have occurred since the sinking of Estonia1994!

So what about "myagenda"?
"AMG" evidently know me and I have no trouble with that. I work for a safety company, correct again, and I wouldn't deny we have a commercial incentive! But, like in quite many other business, we do have as experts the inescapable moral and ethical responsability! You might believe it or not, but if we let our commercial interests push the responsability aside, we would be history in no time!

During the past 4 years since I first layed eyes on the MAIB report of the Lady Candida accident, which got me on the track, I have appalled followed the frequently ocurring accidents with burning yachts; Keturah, the Port Vell 4, Princess Zeyneb is only a few of all those burn-out recent years. Fortunately and by sheer luck; without casualties.

Mentioned MAIB report (see below link) is probably the scariest document I ever read (and I have seen a few...). Nothing in terms of safety systems or routines worked, no one onboard appeared to understand the gravity and urgency of the incident and quite evident, no one ashore was assuming a management responsability.

As the acident ocurred in bright daylight and all onboard enjoying the sun on deck, all 11 pax and 6 crew survived. But if it had happened during night, I doubt anyone would have survived.

A one time only bad occasion one may think? Unfortunately not, the following years reported accidents only proof the poor state of the industry and the fact that the boats are build with combustible material only emphasize how urgent the situation is.

Regretfully, for every new incident, the real disaster comes closer. Please also contmplate the fact that where passenger onboard a ferry or cruise ship is merely cargo, people onboard a yacht is friends and family!

That, my dear new pen pals, are my agenda and my point! We are a number of companies and people experienced and willing to assist and create a safe environment onboard those valuable and beautiful boats!

For reference, I suggest a visit at:
http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2008/lady_candida.cfm

Halon as such is abolished as extinguishing media, but other types are supposed to be installed. Unfortunately, as indicated in another post, like other systems onboard, very often poorly maintained and few know how to use them...

Head on the nail Pascal!
The important thing is how the systems are composed, how they are maintained and not the least; the crew must know how to use them at red alert!
A 100% fire prevention is an utopia, the important thing is to detect them early, prompt action of suppression and adequate crisis management!

Sven, most yachts built over the last 20 years have safety systems to comply with class rules, some better than others of course. In the Lady Candida case, it was bad maintenance and lack of trained crew that caused the sinking. I guess the latter is our major problem, not lack of installed safety systems.

The recent recession may also be a factor why yachts catch fire...

I agree with you in that our boats should be, if not fireproof, so at least with equipment to detect and suppress the fire and to stay afloat. The crew usually has a proper training in fire fighting, but often they are not enough familiar with the systems on the boat they work on.

I know most boats do have systems installed, but a bad system is actually worse than nothing at all. An inferior system creates a deceptive safety...
See also my reply to Pascal.

In my experience, some modern detection systems are too sophisticated, with alarm sensors that as an example are trigged when the boat next to you fires up their engines. All the "false" alarms leads to the crew shutting down the whole system to get a nights sleep...

Fully agree! Maintainance and system composition is the key factor!
The scenario you mentioned with the boat next to you is however far fetched...

Inappropriate shut-off due to nuisance alarms are one of the most common reasons for poor alarm performance

This I have experienced myself, it was a gas sensor that we later disconnected.

But... In the end of the day, the sniffer only did what it was fitted for...
Also telling the abutter, his engines need overhaul...

You could have found a better example than Diva to make the point. As an early and very vocal critic of the system which produced the Lady Candida debacle I understand your concern. However, the actions of the captain and crew of Diva were a textbook example of how to survive such a situation. They recognized a problem, determined the safest way to manage the threat, and acted accordingly.

The fact that the boat caught fire is a separate issue altogether. Why it did and what might have prevented the fire is another discussion that unfortunately may never be held because there is absolutely no way to know what happened and why.

As far as materials go, small and medium sized boats will continue to be constructed of combustible composites until some other more economical material becomes available. It is what it is and the use of those materials is not irresponsible or indicative of an industry failure to acknowledge the risks of those materials.

As one who has very strong opinions on the standards of training and certification in the yacht industry, I am among the first to poke a sharp stick where I believe it will create thought or movement. Given the information available and the results obtained, I have nothing but praise for the actions of the captain and crew of Diva.

Yachts are complex machines that sometimes fail in spectacular fashion. A failure is not always the fault of the crew or its training or attitude. Sometimes a fire is just a fire and fires happen. It is the management of the situation that matters and Diva was well managed in this respect.

I think you can find a better example if you want to campaign for improvement of safety and operational standards.

Sven, i wasn't implying you had an agenda i was really trying to understand what you meant beside outlining the importance of safety equipment and design issues.

thank you for posting the link to the Lady Candida accident, very interesting read. I remember the various "reports" back then but reading the official report is very educating and one can learn a lot from such reading.

I "only" run boats in the 70 foot range, private or charter (uninspected under USCG rules) and safety is something i take seriously but i can see how no matter how careful one can be, some shortcuts can be taken and things overlooked.

in the small boat world, minimal equipment is the standard which is totally insuficient... no smoke detectors, a basic bottle in the ER, and a handful of small fire bottle. Life Jackets are often stored in one location with no consideration on accessibility in case of a fire. One of the first thing i do on a "new to me" boat is put some PFDs in teh anchor locker and at the transom... and then go i look for the automatic engine shutdown override, often hidden somewhere

but, on smaller boats, once a fire has started it's often game over and this is the common attitude: "dont' risk your life saving the boat". we are usually close to shore anyway... this is probably why casualties are very rare.

It is a very different environment than large ships and ferries where the size of the vessels and the number of passengers can create an automatic depth trap once a fire starts.

yet there is a lot we can do to maximize our odds. without second guessing the captains who deserve credit for saving his passengers (Lady Candida) or not causing additional damage to other vessels and sructures (La Divs) i cant' help being surprised that on Lady Candida the captain wasn't more familiar with the alarm system.

again, thanks for posting the link, many other interesting reports on the MAIB site... good reading!

Stuff does happen. Weird stuff, even.

I was told by a knowledgeable sort that the Hubble shore connection(s) is a maintenance item: one needs to periodically tighten the screws on the wire ends, or else as they tend to loosen up over time, resistance increases to the point where they get really hot and have caused fires.
I know this to be true.
But, who periodically checks their shore cord connections?

The passengers and crew on Lady Candida survived in spite of the captain, his incompetence, lack of knowledge, and his poorly considered actions.

Lady Candida is the poster boat for flag state apathy and the failings of the MCA yacht crew licensing scheme.

Interesting this is X-Ivana. She has a colorful history.

Absolutely correct! In this case skipper and crew acted exemplary and your remark that the actual reason for the fire is another issue I agree to too.

Yet, the outcome could have been different if detection, isolation and suppression onboard had been better composed or perhaps maintained...
This is of course hypothetic, but your remark of using combustable material for construction is head on the nail and one of the major hurdles for improving safety.

In effect yesterday actually, SOLAS 2010 abolish all kind of combustible material in all compliant vessels. Existing or under construction.
How that is to be complied with for SOLAS-superyachts I don't know, but for sure, this matter is the key issue for any safety enhancement.

When reading the Lady C report, please note two majors; when the fire was discovered, the accommodation was filled with smoke and the boat was burnde out after 45 minutes.

I.e. if that fire had started in the middle of the night, only crew on watch would had survived.
I also agree with previous speakers opinion of authorities...

I have written much about this incident and don't really care to rehash a seedy part of yachting history but please note that there was no engineer onboard as required by the manning certificate. The boat should have never left the dock.

The captain had no firefighting training (yet still held a license) and this contributed to a list of bad decisions on his part that increased the rate of increase of the fire and put his passengers and crew at risk.

The captain did not know enough about his vessel to know how to start the fire pump. He had never done it and didn't know how it was powered and from where.

The bottom line is that an incompetent and unqualified person was improperly issued an MCA license to carry passengers for hire. He chose to ignore the safe manning certificate, he chose to not attend fire training. He chose to put the head of the vessel into a 20 knot wind with a hatch open to provide oxygen to the fire. He chose not to learn the vessel's systems. He chose not to make any effort to prevent the spread of the fire.

The MCA holds a great deal of blame for this incident and others that will, without a doubt, follow.

We are at 100% agree and on the same track!
Training of crew is another essential matter in need of improvement. No matter what fancy equipment fitted if it's not shipshape or no one know how to use it...

Two things I hope someone can educate me on:
1) In recent years I've found many bottles (engine room systems) mounted with the gauge facing the wall so they can only be read with a mirror. What's with that?
2) A surveyor recently told me that the new systems are supposed to be serviced every 6 months. true/false?

Maybe the operator was concerned about whacking the gauge face?

I would ask him to provide a document to support that claim and to define a "new system." Many "surveyors" are notorious for not knowing their butt from a bollard and seem to take great pleasure in forcing boat owners to spend money needlessly.

If you are driving a private pleasure boat read the label on the extinguisher, it will state the maintenance requirement. Generally, if it's a CO2 extinguisher it should be weighed every 6 months and recharged (serviced) if the weight has dropped 10 percent. Hydro every 5 years. You can weigh it yourself.

If it's a dry chemical unit, check the pressure is within limits marked on the gauge and bounce the unit on the deck to shake up the chemical so it doesn't cake. Hydro every 5 years.

If the boat is an uninspected passenger vessel (a 6 passenger charter boat) then the CFRs require you to follow the NFPA guidlines for inspection and recertification of fixed and portable systems. Everything you need to know is in the CFRs, the manufacturer's CG approval docs, and the NVICs.