Palm Beach yacht fire - La Diva is destroyed

Good we are back on track again after the detour to Estonia!

The latest postings brings us back to my original point; how is a yacht build, equipped and operated?

The latest contributors comments confirms; an inferior safety system is worse than having nothing at all!

I'll not bore you and repeat myself, but suggest a link to an article I have had published in several magazines: http://en.calameo.com/read/000138312eb6c9b39768f

If interested, pick it up an fold to page 15. I hope you agree the whole issue is quite well described, history, improvements and suggested actions.

Hi,

I don't dis agree that the speed may well have been too high for the conditions but the fact that there was a major defect in the construction also has a part to play in this disaster.

Hi,

Pascal, I am yet to see an fully automatic C02 System installed on a yacht.

Likewise Smoke Alarms are the most common cause of False Alarms, the Toaster in the crews mess and steam in the Laundry being regular triggers for these.

I don't want to step into Stephen Colbert's footsteps and organize a march "to keep fear alive", but Pascal, which engine room fire systems are automatic?

On all the yachts and commercial ships I've been on through the years, I have hardly ever seen an automatic system in the engine room, and it was never the "main system".

The only "automatic" sytem I have ever seen in an engine room (or switchboard room for that matter) is a FirePro system, which stops the flame with a chemical reaction. I must admit I am in the bigger boats (>24 m) and such systems may be common on smaller yachts.

The principle with engine room fires is that the fire should be detected (visually or through smoke detectors), then all ventilation should be shut down and fire dampers closed, and then the oxygen levels made unsuitable for fire by adding an extinguishing gas (be that CO2, FM200 or others).
This is the best way to kill a fire, as it's not easy to stop a built-up fuel fire. Such a system is also required by MCA.
These systems are manually activated, as you're unlikely to make it out alive if such a system is activated while you're in the engine room.

A watermist fire extinghuishing system may also be used instead, but that will require you to have an emergency genset above the main deck, as the watermist systems need power for their pump. Watermist systems for engine rooms are usually also activated manually, but they could be made to trigger automatically.

The achilles heel of these manually-activated systems is that everything relies on the fire being detected. With the engine room ventilation running, it may take a while (or in some cases forever) before a smoke detector sees enough smoke to cause an alarm. I therefore recommend to install also flame detectors and heat detectors in the engine room (and CCTV).

Again, the regulations were made for large commercial vessels with (often) manned engine rooms, and MCA adapted them for yachts. It's up to the owners (or their representatives) to specify a safe boat "a la carte". The problem is, most owners believe that a yacht is safe as soon as it's built under class and MCA rules.

Bruno

Absolutely, but again; that wouldn't have been discovered without the destruction of the bow visor! At least not this brutal way...

1: Automatic CO2 release are not and will never be allowed.
2: False alarms is due to poorly composed. maintained or inferior system. The detector is just a daft component doing its job. Perhaps fitted in the wrong spot?
Engineers facing the same hassle in the ER.

Timer inhibition functions is one way of solving such problem.

1: Again and again; composition and integration of safety systems are the key factor!
2: Water mist systems are available with Nitrogen driven vessels. I belive most yachts have ER's small enough for the to be feasible.

Fire systems

The best fire control system that I've ever seen was a twin 100 lb bottle co2 with a 10lb compressed air warning bottle that emptied before the co2 was discharged and gave the engineer or eng room occupant a 15 second get out warning and by plumbing the discharge thru a switch that shut down the ventilators it was very effective. It had two eng room heat sensors and two remote pulls. It was inspected yearly and every 5 yrs during hydrostatic testing was test fired thru the temp sensors. {heat gun}

Hi,

I am quite well aware of the hassles faced by engineers in engine rooms and elsewhere on board.

I posed this statement as a question to Flag. This is the response.

The visual and audible alarm at the control panel must be immediate, with a delay of up to 2 minutes before an audible alarm sounds throughout the accommodation and crew spaces.

Hi,

Was this on a commercial or military vessel?

I was on an older vessel that had a gas driven siren, it was still a manual release system though.

The IMO has a bit to say about the arrangement of CO2 Systems

It can be found at the IMO's FSS Code, Chapter 5, Clause 2.2.2.1 amongst the plethora of text is this: two separate controls shall be provided for releasing carbon dioxide into a protected space and to ensure the activation of the alarm. One control shall be used for opening the valve of the piping which conveys the gas into the protected space and a second control shall be used to discharge the gas from its storage containers. Positive means shall be provided so they can only be operated in that order".

61c40, was that system automatically activated by the heat sensors or only through the remote pulls?
An automatic CO2 system seems very unlikely to me. It would basically overshoot its purpose, as accidental casualties would be very likely (someone may be unconscious in the engine room, or not hear the alarm in the 110 dB(A) noise).

Bruno

"... accidental casualties would be very likely ..."

They are more than likely, they would almost be assured. Accidental casualties are all to common as is despite the level of manual control and high degree of crew training.

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) guidelines have been adapted by the USCG and referenced for regulatory purposes. The US Codeof Federal Regulations (CFRs) dictates the method and application. SOLAS dictates the method and application for vessels in international service.

The following is from a US EPA document that outlines the applications and general regulations governing the use of CO2 in marine fire protection systems.

"International maritime use of carbon dioxide extinguishing systems is extensive. Fire protection in these applications is covered under the regulations and requirements set forth in the International Maritime Organization's SOLAS (IMO 1992). As with NFPA 12, SOLAS does not prevent the use of carbon dioxide in normally occupied areas. Also similar to NFPA, SOLAS requires that "means be provided for automatically giving audible warning of the release of fire-extinguishing medium into a space in which personnel normally work or to which they have access." The alarm must operate for a suitable amount of time prior to the gas being released. Similar to NFPA 12, SOLAS requires that access doors to the areas where fire-extinguishing medium is stored shall have doors that open outwards. These requirements are not differentiated for carbon dioxide or halogenated hydrocarbon or inert gas agent systems. Unlike NFPA, SOLAS mandates that "automatic release of gaseous fire-extinguishing medium shall not be permitted" except with respect to local application systems.

USCG regulations for carbon dioxide systems in passenger vessels are documented in 46 CFR Part 76.15. Separate subparts describe different types of vessels. Similar to SOLAS, 46 CFR Part 76.15 stipulates manual control of cylinder activation. (It should be noted that 46 CFR Part 76.15-20 stipulates that "Systems...consisting of not more than 300 lb of carbon dioxide, may have the cylinders located within the space protected. If the cylinder stowage is within the space protected, the system shall be arranged in an approved manner to be automatically operated by a heat actuator within the space in addition to the regular remote and local controls.") 46 CFR Part 76.15 also requires that systems using more than 300 lb of carbon dioxide must be fitted with an "approved delayed discharge" arranged in such a way that when the alarm sounds the carbon dioxide is not released for at least 20 seconds. This requirement also may pertain to systems of less than 300 lb depending on the number of protected levels and the egress pathway configurations. To minimize the possibility of inadvertent actuations, USCG specifies that two separate manual controls be operated for release of carbon dioxide, thereby requiring two independent actuations to occur before carbon dioxide discharges into the protected space. In addition, all personnel must be evacuated from the protected space prior to performing any testing or maintenance on the carbon dioxide system (Willms 1999). (The 2000 edition of the NFPA 12 Standard includes a chapter on marine applications mandating evacuation of a space prior to testing and other activities (Willms 1999))"

The EPA document is available online at:
http://www.epa.gov/ozone/snap/fire/co2/co2report.html

A flow chart of the activation procedure on a ship is in figure 2:
http://www.epa.gov/ozone/snap/fire/co2/figures1&2.pdf

Military: Army T built 1953 I beleive it was a Kidde system, remotes triggered system with out warning bottle, heat sensors went thru the warning bottle. If a man was incapacitated in the eng room he was SOL personally I rather asphiaxiate than burn to death! I could hear the horns over the eng room noise with engines running (I tried it )Yacht fires seem to be electrical or water cooled exhaust in the majority of the cases, increased monitoring of exhaust riser temps would be a prudent investment (alarm that works 100%) Besides shore electrical issues, unfused DC starting and charging circuits have IMO the greatest potential for fire aboard pleasure craft. Back when I first found YF there was a Sunseeker fire that I asked if anyone knew the cause. Does any know now?

Hey, hey Guys!
Forget Co2, Halon or conventional sprinklers!
Water mist is the superior suppression, useful in accommodation, ER and even in the galley!

CO2 kills people, halon destroy the environment and conv sprinkler may be more harmful than the fire itself!

Using fresh water, it not even destry furnitures or textiles.
(Well... Hmmm...).

Still; composition is the key!

Water is not such a good thing on electrical or petroleum fires. Two things there are plenty of in the ER.

It's kind of hard to forget when it's installed in a about 99.99 percent of the world's vessels that have fixed fire extinguishing systems.

Really, I thought the Hi-Fog systems have been installed since almost 20 years after Halon was put on the black list? Some yachts must have it anyway and it works in enginerooms as well.