El Faro: NTSB findings so far, EL Faro's boilers needed servicing

That'll be no help to the ambulance chaser who's already filed suit against the company and the deceased captain. I've never heard the term "scuttle" as a noun that I can recall. What is that? My guess is some sort of drain in the hold, but I'd like more accurate info if anyone knows.

When a company shows disregard for it's employees, I don't call that an ambulance chaser.

Maybe this will help you: www.google.com/search?q=scuttle&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8#q=scuttle+marine

That's not what I read, I'll leave that debate to the lawyers however. Sorry, but when you start a lawsuit before the investigation begins, that's an ambulance chaser in my book

Agreed. In fact maybe we should walk away from it until more info comes in.

Thank you Leeky. Know them well. Just never heard the term. Always just referred to them as hatches. The context had me thinking it was something else. I like days when I learn.
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Once a hatch ( scuttle)has been breached the end can get very messy indeed.

The bit I am posting below was taken from Wikipedia and refers to the largest British ship ever lost.

The formal investigation commenced on 2 April 2000. It concluded that the ship sank because of structural failure and absolved the crew of any responsibility.


Evidence from the underwater surveys showed that the closing appliances for nine ventilator openings in the bow section of the ship were missing; it was concluded that this had allowed seawater to flood into the ship and cause it to trim down by the bow. This adverse forward trim enabled storm force waves to batter the foremost cargo hold hatch covers causing them to collapse and the forward cargo hold to then flood with sea water. The same process was repeated on the number two and number three cargo holds. The additional weight of seawater, coupled with the heavy seas during Typhoon Orchid, caused the main hull to suffer a catastrophic structural collapse and the vessel to founder.

The thread title seems to be sensationalist as it implies that a critical piece of information has just been uncovered.

"On September 11, 2015, TOTE received permission from the Coast Guard to shut down one of the ship's two boilers so it could be inspected by an independent boiler service company during a voyage between San Juan and Jacksonville. As a result of the inspection, the boiler service company recommended service to both boilers during an upcoming drydock period that had already been scheduled for November 6. The boiler was returned to service following the inspection."

All that says is that the service contractor was onboard to define the scope of boiler work that was already planned. What would be interesting, and possibly have some meaning, is if TOTE did NOT plan to perform any boiler "service" during the scheduled yard period. Boilers live a hard life and there is always something needing "service" from brickwork to economizer cleaning or a valve repacked. That piece of information is no more "critical" than if a memo was found that the galley soap dispenser needed a new gasket.

A steam plant is a very complex arrangement of complex parts. There is always something that needs attention, leaks, makes funny noises, or might be described in an evaluation as needing to be serviced at some point in the future. It is the nature of the thing. Steam plants are very reliable and will operate satisfactorily with some parts bypassed or placed in manual control because of any number of reasons. I would go so far as to say that a steam plant is more reliable than a fully automated motor plant. Boilers can run with leaking or plugged tubes. If the contractor who stood to make money thought the boiler was OK to run for another 1500 hours then it is fair to assume that "service" meant just that and only that.

It doesn't mean there is a headline or even a story when a journalist finds out that the gland seal steam regulator or some other component constantly needed tweaking, was operated manually, or some other of the tens of thousands of parts needed a rebuild when the plant was scheduled for a shut down or time allowed.

There probably will be lots of juicy details by the time the investigation is complete but to call this nano sized and very routine piece of information a "finding" is at the least, sensationalist and its use in the context of a headline should make readers question the intent of the headline writers, not the content.

Slow news day, need to bump the story to keep readership or viewers hooked? Reader beware.

This morning on the TV news they reported that the Captain of El Faro's float plan was to pass 65 NM East of the storm. A retired sea Captain was quoted as saying he thought that was irresponsible and that he personally always stayed 300 NM from any such storm.
When I googled their website just now for citation, there was no mention of that report. It was on Action News, Philadelphia.
I thought it was ironic that I heard that report this morning and Capt J's post # 1 was the first thing I read this morning.

Next news won't be until the USNS Apache reaches the site and hopefully locates the El Faro. To date all we know is that a scuttle had blown open, there was water in hold number 3, the ship had lost its main propulsion unit and the engineers could not get it going. The ship went down taking all (33) hands to their grave. Additionally the ship had apparently passed recent inspections, and (to me) the captain acted prudently in his course selection. To me it sounds like "Murphy" conspired with a hurricane to create a tragic situation. That's life and death on the water.
Yes the 2nd part of the thread title could (should) have been left out, but let's not make something of nothing. Instead let's just wait for the report from Apache.

Did he happen to mention whether he was referring to the east (strong) or west (weak) side? Big difference. Was he talking about a cat. 1 or a cat. 4. Again big difference. Did he even look at where a 300 nm diversion to the west would have put the El Faro or was he suggesting she take an 18 hour diversion to the east, the more likely direction the hurricane would head? I consider that statement irresponsible, and the Monday morning quarterbacking of a has-been looking for his 15 minutes of fame or a few dollars from a lawyer.

This text is in the report linked to above.

At 1:12 p.m. on September 30, the captain emailed a company safety official that he intended to take a route south of the predicted path of the hurricane and would pass about 65 miles from its center.

Once the captain made the decision to take the regular direct route on the east side of the bahamas, he basically trapped himself and started a race against the storm try to squeeze thru. It s not much different from those people who try to squeeze thru rail road crossing gates with a train barreling down, only to have their car stall.

To the captain's defense the storm was only moving at 5kts and at the time of that email the storm was 70 kts forecast to be 85kts the next morning. unfortunately the forecast was off and the next day by the time they declared an emergency winds were 105 kts.

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2015/JOAQUIN.shtml

There are too lessons to be learned from this tragedy... First, don't play chicken with a hurricane. Second, while the NHC track forecast are usually very accurate, intensity forecasts are not. This was the case with Joaquin and dozens of storms in the past few years. Always always always plan for a stronger than forecast storms (unless of course the forecast makes it very clear than the system wil encounter strong shear)

This is true whether you are running a 1000' ship or simply trying to deal with a small boat at your local marina

Not true..look at the link I posted in my previous post.the storm was moving WSW, almost SW. On the 30th at 5 am it was at 25.4 N and forecasted to stay pretty much close to 25N. 24 hours later, it was at 23.4 N when El Faro sunk... Big difference. That's another thing to keep in mind when making hurricane plans, slow moving storms often behave more erratically than those moving thru well established steering currents.

I find these five paragraphs very revealing.

Before El Faro departed Jacksonville, Tropical Storm Joaquin was predicted to become a hurricane and a marine hurricane warning was issued by the National Hurricane Center’s Advisory #8 at 5:00 pm EDT on Sept. 29.

At about 8:15 pm EDT on Sept. 29, El Faro departed Jacksonville, Fla., for San Juan, Puerto Rico.

At 1:12 pm EDT on Sept. 30, the captain emailed a company safety official that he intended to take a route south of the predicted path of the hurricane and would pass about 65 miles from its center.

In an advisory issued at 2:00 am EDT on Oct. 1, the National Hurricane Center predicted seas of 30 feet with sustained winds of 64 knots (74 mph), increasing to 105 knots (121 mph) as the El Faro approached the wall of the eye of the hurricane.

In a recorded satellite phone call to the company’s emergency call center at 7:00 am EDT, the captain told the call center operator that he had a marine emergency.
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Translated: There was a hurricane warning over 3 hours ago. "Oh, don't worry, we'll pass 65 miles from it's center". Update: 30 ft seas 105 knot wins and you're approaching the eye. "We shall not be deterred. Sticking to the plan." Then, "Oops...we have an emergency".